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Abstract 
To better understand the dynamics of the Chinese economy and its interaction with the 
global economy, the authors incorporate China into an existing model for the G-3 
economies (i.e., the United States, the euro area, and Japan), paying particular attention to 
modelling the exchange rate and monetary policy in China. Their findings suggest that 
the Chinese economy adjusts more slowly to shocks, compared to the large advanced 
economies, because monetary policy is less effective and the real exchange rate more 
persistent. In addition, the authors’ model underscores the importance of spillovers from 
China to the G-3 economies, and vice versa, thus highlighting the need to analyze the 
Chinese economy in a global context. 
JEL classification: E32, E52, F41 
Bank classification: Economic models; International topics; Business fluctuations and 
cycles; Exchange rate regimes 
Résumé 
Pour mieux comprendre la dynamique de l’économie chinoise et la manière dont elle 
interagit avec le reste du monde, les auteurs intègrent la Chine à un modèle qui englobe 
les économies du «  G3  » (États-Unis, zone euro et Japon) en prêtant une attention 
particulière à la modélisation de la politique monétaire de ce pays et du taux de change du 
yuan. Leurs résultats indiquent que l’économie chinoise s’ajuste plus lentement aux chocs 
que les grandes économies avancées parce que la politique monétaire y est moins efficace 
et le taux de change réel plus persistant. Le modèle des auteurs fait également ressortir 
l’importance des influences réciproques entre la Chine et les économies du G3, d’où la 
nécessité de situer l’analyse de l’économie chinoise dans un cadre mondial. 
Classification JEL : E32, E52, F41 
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Questions internationales; Cycles et 
fluctuations économiques; Régimes de taux de change 
 
 1 Introduction
In recent years, China's importance to the global economy has increased rapidly. China's
gross domestic product (GDP) is now the second largest in the world, and in 2009 China
surpassed Germany and the United States as the world's largest exporter.1 Given China's
rising economic importance and extensive international linkages, it is important to develop a
better understanding of the dynamics of the Chinese economy and its interactions with the
global economy. Surprisingly, there are few studies that provide a model-based analysis of
the transmission and propagation of shocks to the Chinese economy in a global setting. This
paper contributes in that regard by incorporating China into an existing global model for the
G-3 economies (i.e., the United States, the euro area, and Japan) and using the new extended
model to study how shocks, both domestic and external, are transmitted and propagated in
the Chinese economy.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ¯rst to examine this question with a global model whose
parameters are estimated. Our model is based on the framework developed by Carabenciov
et al. (2008) for the G-3 economies: the Global Projection Model (GPM).2 Given that this
model is designed for a typical advanced economy, we modify its structure to better capture
the key characteristics of the heavily managed Chinese economy. Our work pays particular
attention to modelling the exchange rate and monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy
in China is modelled using a combination of two monetary policy reaction functions: a Taylor-
type rule, and a monetary policy rule based on the control of the money supply in the spirit of
McCallum (1988). An exchange rate variable is included in both equations to account for the
fact that the Chinese authorities place considerable weight on controlling the exchange rate
when setting monetary policy. And the real exchange rate is modelled taking into account
the presence of a trend in both the actual and equilibrium real exchange rates, as well as
China's exchange rate regime, where the authorities control, to a large extent, movements in
the exchange rate.
Modelling the Chinese economy is a challenging undertaking given its rapid, but as-of-yet
incomplete, transformation from a command to a market economy. We believe the framework
used in the paper is particularly well suited to study the Chinese economy, for four reasons.
First, the benchmark model is su±ciently °exible that it can be adapted to better capture the
key characteristics of the Chinese economy. And, despite this °exibility, the framework used
has solid theoretical underpinnings, since it is based on richer models with microfoundations.
1China's GDP is ranked second, after the United States, when measured in purchasing-power parity. China
was the world's largest exporter in 2009, according to the World Trade Organization.
2The GPM is a simple reduced-form model that is intended to capture the main ingredients behind richer
models with microfoundations. It blends New Keynesian elements with the real business cycle tradition
methods of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling with rational expectations.
1Second, the global nature of the model enables us to capture the important international
linkages between China and the three largest advanced economies. With this framework, we
are able to capture not only the direct e®ects of each shock on the Chinese economy (for
example, a shock to U.S. in°ation), but also the indirect e®ects that are transmitted to China
via the response of the other countries to each shock. Third, the global model is simple enough
that it can be estimated using Bayesian methods, which enables us to incorporate information
from our priors with that contained in the data. The Bayesian approach is particularly useful
in the case of China, since some of the parameters in the model may be weakly identi¯ed by
the data, given the short sample period available and the nature of the Chinese economy. The
use of priors can help add structure to these otherwise uninformative data, thus giving rise
to more sensible posterior parameter estimates. And ¯nally, the model also yields interesting
insights into the determinants of Chinese monetary policy, the evolution of Chinese in°ation,
and the factors driving movements in the Chinese output gap over history.
Our paper should be viewed as complementing related work. Although China isn't explic-
itly modelled, emerging Asia is one of the regions in the Global Economy Model (GEM), a
multi-country DSGE model based on a fully de¯ned optimizing framework (see Laxton 2008
for more information on the GEM). Our work also complements a recent paper by Straub
and Thimann (2009), who develop an open-economy model for China with a focus on ana-
lyzing both the domestic and the external implications of a change in the Chinese exchange
rate regime. The focus of those two papers di®ers from ours, and the models in both are
calibrated, whereas our model is estimated. However, all three papers emphasize the need
to adapt macroeconomic models developed for the advanced economies in order to better
capture the key characteristics of the Chinese economy, as well as emphasize the importance
of studying the Chinese economy in a global setting.
Our paper yields several interesting ¯ndings. First, we ¯nd that foreign demand shocks
have more important e®ects on the Chinese economy than on the large advanced economies.
Moreover, a historical decomposition of our model-based estimate of the Chinese output gap
suggests that external demand has played an important role in explaining movements in the
Chinese output gap over the past decade. These results are not surprising, given that China is
a very open economy. They also highlight the importance of modelling the Chinese economy
in a global setting that can properly account for key linkages across the major economies.
Second, we ¯nd that Chinese shocks, particularly real equilibrium exchange rate shocks, are
not only a key driver of the Chinese economy, but they also play an important role in the other
advanced economies. This is consistent with the view that shocks to the Chinese economy have
had important e®ects on the global economy in recent years, and underscores the importance
of including China in global models given its key role in the world economy. Third, our
2results suggest that the Chinese economy adjusts more slowly to shocks, compared to the
large advanced economies, because monetary policy is less e®ective and the real exchange
rate more persistent. Overall, our model displays sensible properties and does a reasonably
good job of replicating the key dynamics of the Chinese economy, suggesting that it is a useful
framework for analyzing China.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the framework used to model
the Chinese economy in a multi-country setting. In section 3, we discuss the estimation
methodology and parameter estimates. In section 4, we use the estimated model to analyze
the e®ects of shocks on the Chinese economy, and compare them to the advanced economies by
using both impulse-response functions and variance decompositions. In section 5, we consider
the model's interpretation of history, and in section 6 we o®er some conclusions.
2 Model
We model the Chinese economy in a multi-country setting by incorporating it into an existing
3-country model, the GPM, developed by Carabenciov et al. (2008). This framework is
intended to capture the main elements of richer models with microfoundations. It blends
New Keynesian elements { namely, an emphasis on nominal and real rigidities and a central
role for aggregate demand in output determination { with the real business cycle tradition
methods of DSGE modelling with rational expectations. The GPM integrates a series of
country models into a single global model, where the key features of the macroeconomic
structure of each economy are characterized by a small number of behavioural equations.
These also capture linkages across countries, and, in addition, exogenous stochastic processes
for the unobservable variables are speci¯ed.
Given that the value-added of our paper is that it extends Carabenciov et al.'s (2008) model
for the G-3 countries to include China, this section focuses on the model for the Chinese
economy. In doing so, we make modi¯cations to the structure of the benchmark country
model, designed for a typical advanced economy, to better capture the key characteristics of
the heavily managed Chinese economy and to successfully replicate both its macroeconomic
dynamics and the e®ects of Chinese shocks on the major advanced economies.3 We pay
particular attention to how the exchange rate and monetary policy process are modelled,
to ensure that the model adequately captures how monetary and exchange rate policy are
conducted in China.
3More details on the structure of the benchmark country model, used to model the economies of the United
States, the euro area, and Japan, are provided in Appendix A.
32.1 Behavioural equations
There are four behavioural equations at the core of the model for the Chinese economy.
The ¯rst behavioural equation is an aggregate demand, or IS, curve that relates the level
of Chinese real activity to expected and past real activity, the real interest rate, the rate of
money growth, the real exchange rate, and the level of real activity in the economies of its
trading partners. All variables are expressed as deviations from their equilibrium values so
that the aggregate demand equation relates the output gap to its determinants as follows:
ych;t = ¯ch;1ych;t¡1 + ¯ch;2ych;t+1 ¡ ¯ch;3(Rch;t¡1 ¡ Rch;t¡1) (1)
+ ¯ch;4((¢Mch;t¡1 ¡ ¼4ch;t¡1) ¡ (¢Mch;t¡1 ¡ ¼
tar










where y is the output gap, R is the real interest rate, R is the equilibrium real interest rate,
¢M is the quarterly growth rate of the money supply (at annual rates), ¼4 is the 4-quarter
moving-average in°ation rate, ¢M is the growth rate of the equilibrium level of the money
supply, ¼tar is the in°ation target, Zch;j is the bilateral real exchange rate of the Chinese
renminbi (RMB) relative to that of country j (such that an increase in Zch;j represents a
real depreciation of the Chinese RMB relative to the currency of country j), Zch;j is the
equilibrium bilateral real exchange rate of the Chinese currency relative to that of country j,
and "y is a disturbance term.4 The foreign output-gap term is de¯ned as a weighted average
of the foreign output gaps, where the weights (wch;j;5) used are the ratios of Chinese exports
to country j to its total exports to all the countries in the model.
The lead term captures the forward-looking elements in aggregate demand that arise in a
framework where forward-looking households optimize their consumption. Thus, expectations
of the future performance of the economy are assumed to in°uence current aggregate demand,
because of the forward-looking nature of decisions made by individual households and ¯rms.
The own-lag term allows for inertia in the system and permits shocks to have persistent e®ects.
As discussed in Clarida et al. (1999), the primary justi¯cation for allowing some form of lagged
dependence in the IS curve is empirical, although it may be possible to explicitly motivate its
presence by appealing to some form of adjustment costs. The real interest rate and money
gap terms provide the crucial link between monetary policy actions and the real economy.
Given the sluggish adjustment of prices, by varying the nominal interest rate or the growth
4The weights used to construct the e®ective real exchange rate term (wch;j;4) are the ratios of the sum of
Chinese exports and imports with country j to the sum of its exports and imports with all the countries in
the model.
4rate of money the central bank is able to in°uence the real interest rate (or credit-growth)
gap, and hence aggregate demand. The foreign activity variable and the real exchange rate
term allow for critical links between the Chinese economy and the other economies in the
model.
The second equation is an in°ation equation, or Phillips curve, which links in°ation to its
past and future values, the lagged output gap, the e®ective exchange rate gap, and oil-price
in°ation. The Chinese in°ation equation is thus assumed to take the following form:











where ¼ is the quarterly rate of in°ation (at annual rates), ¼RPOIL is the rate of in°ation of
real oil prices (denominated in the domestic currency), and "¼ is a disturbance term. The
weights (wch;j;3) used to construct the e®ective exchange rate term are the ratios of Chinese
imports from country j to its total imports from all the countries in the model.
This in°ation equation is in the spirit of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), which
evolves from the optimal price-setting behaviour of forward-looking ¯rms in an environment
of imperfect competition and price stickiness (i.e., it is assumed that ¯rms set prices on a
staggered basis). Equation (2) thus emphasizes the forward-looking process for in°ation.
And, as discussed in Gali and Gertler (1999), lagged in°ation can also in°uence in°ation
dynamics in the NKPC framework if it is assumed that a fraction of ¯rms set prices using a
backward-looking rule of thumb. In°ation is also a function of the output gap, which in the
NKPC set-up would be a proxy for marginal cost.5
In an open-economy setting, it is also appropriate to include an exchange rate term in the
in°ation equation. da Silveira, M. (2006) derives a version of the NKPC from a 2-country
DSGE model in which the deviation of the terms of trade from its equilibrium value enters as
a determinant of in°ation to capture shifts in marginal cost that arise as a result of changes
in the terms of trade. In our in°ation equation for China, we use the exchange rate to
proxy for the terms of trade, and hence include the change in the e®ective exchange rate gap
as a determinant of in°ation. We would expect a depreciation of the exchange rate above
its equilibrium value to put upward pressure on prices, because of the resulting increase in
marginal cost.
Equations (3) and (4) depict the monetary policy process in China. The third equation is
the interest rate reaction function, where the short-term nominal interest rate is determined
5Since it is assumed in the NKPC framework that ¯rms adjust their prices in response to expected move-
ments in marginal cost.
5as a function of its own lag and of the central bank's policy responses to movements of
the output gap, deviations of the expected in°ation rate from its target, and deviations of
the rate of depreciation of the bilateral exchange rate of the Chinese RMB (relative to the
U.S. dollar) from its targeted value.6 One key di®erence between the Chinese monetary policy
reaction function and that for the advanced economies (shown in Appendix A) is that Chinese
policy rates also respond to deviations in the nominal exchange rate from a targeted path for
appreciation or depreciation, unlike policy rates in the advanced economies. This Taylor-type
rule for China takes the following form:
Ich;t = (1 ¡ °ch;1)[Rch;t + ¼4ch;t+3 + °ch;2(¼4ch;t+3 ¡ ¼
tar
ch ) (3)
+ °ch;4ych;t] + °ch;5(¢Sch;t ¡ ¢Zch;t ¡ ¢S
tar
ch;t) + °ch;1Ich;t¡1 + "
I
ch;t
where I is the short-term nominal interest rate, ¢S is the nominal bilateral rate of depreciation
of the Chinese RMB relative to the U.S. dollar, ¢Star is the targeted value of the nominal
bilateral rate of depreciation of the Chinese RMB relative to the U.S. dollar, and "I is a
disturbance term.
This speci¯cation for the monetary policy rule assumes that the central bank smooths in-
terest rates, adjusting them gradually to the desired value. This behaviour is widely observed
in practice and has been shown by Woodford (2003) to be a desirable outcome in a model for
optimizing private sector behaviour, because it can help to steer private sector expectations
of future policy.
The inclusion of an exchange rate term in the Chinese monetary policy reaction function
accounts for the fact that the authorities put substantial weight on controlling the exchange
rate when setting monetary policy. Monetary policy in China is therefore likely to respond
to unwanted pressures or changes in the exchange rate. The Chinese interest rate reaction
function captures the multidimensional nature of their mandate, where the authorities react
not only to movements in the output gap and deviations of in°ation from its target, but also
to deviations of the rate of change of the exchange rate from its target. Thus, the Chinese
central bank can be thought of as having a triple mandate, in contrast to the more conventional
dual mandate that is assumed for the G-3 economies. As a result of this approach, Chinese
monetary policy is less precise in its ability to control any one of the three components of its
mandate.
It has become quite standard to characterize monetary policy in macroeconomic models
via the implementation of an interest rate rule such as this one, which assumes that the
6The in°ation target in China is assumed to be 3 per cent. This value is roughly consistent with the
average over the sample period of the in°ation target of the People's Bank of China, which is stated annually
in its Annual Report (various years).
6central bank's main instrument is the short-term interest rate. Although this assumption
clearly applies to most advanced economies, it is not clear that, on its own, an interest rate
rule would adequately describe the monetary policy process in China, because the People's
Bank of China (PBoC) uses several monetary policy instruments.7 We thus augment the
Taylor-type rule with a monetary policy rule based on the control of the money supply, in
the spirit of McCallum (1988). Such a rule is intended to capture monetary policy responses
based on monetary aggregates, rather than interest rates. The focus on money as one of the
key monetary policy instruments is consistent both with the PBoC's emphasis on monetary
targeting and with empirical work investigating the ¯t of McCallum-type rules for China.8
Our money-based monetary policy rule takes the following form:
¢Mch;t = &ch;1¢Mch;t¡1 + (1 ¡ &ch;1)[¢Mch;t ¡ &ch;2(¼4ch;t+3 ¡ ¼
tar
ch ) ¡ &ch;3ych;t] (4)





where M is the money supply and "¢M is a disturbance term.
The objectives of this money-based policy rule are similar to those set out in the interest
rate reaction function de¯ned above. Speci¯cally, in the short run, the authorities deviate from
the equilibrium growth rate for M29 in response to deviations of in°ation from its targeted
value, movements in the output gap, and changes in the exchange rate beyond the targeted
rate of appreciation. The response of this variable to any given shock is precisely the opposite
of what we saw in the interest rate reaction function, since an increase in M2 is expansionary,
while an increase in interest rates is contractionary.
Modelling the behaviour of China's real exchange rate is a challenging undertaking. In
contrast to the G-3 economies that have °exible exchange rates, China has an exchange
rate regime with extensive capital controls where the authorities control, to a large extent,
movements in the exchange rate. As shown in Appendix B, both the nominal and real e®ective
exchange rates in China appreciated steadily starting in July 2005, following the liberalization
of the exchange rate regime, until the onset of the global ¯nancial crisis in 2008. It has been
argued that the equilibrium real exchange rate also appreciated over this period, although
not to the same extent as the actual real exchange rate, as a result of strong productivity
growth in the tradable-goods sector.10 As a result of these Balassa-Samuelson e®ects, there
is a trend in China's equilibrium real exchange rate.11 Thus, an important characteristic of
7For more on the di®erent monetary policy instruments used by the PBoC, see Goodfriend and Prasad
(2006).
8For examples of the latter, see Burdekin and Siklos (2008), and Koivu et al. (2008).
9M2, or money growth, is used as a proxy for the growth of credit in the Chinese economy.
10For instance, see Straub and Thimann (2009).
11According to the Balassa-Samuelson e®ect, based on Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), if productivity
7the Chinese exchange rate regime is the presence of a trend in both the equilibrium and the
actual real exchange rates.
Following Carabenciov et al. (2008), we model the exchange rate in the three advanced
economies using a version of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), the approach typically used
to model the exchange rate in standard open-economy macroeconomic models; the equilibrium
exchange rate for the advanced economies is modelled as a random walk. This approach is
clearly not appropriate for China, because it could not replicate the sustained { and controlled
{ appreciation of the actual exchange rate that we have witnessed in recent years and that
we expect to continue in years to come. Nor could it account for the sustained appreciation
of the equilibrium real exchange rate that has resulted from strong productivity growth in
the tradable-goods sector. We thus modify the UIP and equilibrium exchange rate equations
for China so that we are better able to capture the behaviour of China's real exchange rate,
both equilibrium and actual.




ch;t+1 ¡ Zi;t) ¡ ¢Zch;t+1 = (Rch;t ¡ Rus;t) ¡ (Rch;t ¡ Rus;t) + "
Z¡Ze
ch;t ; (5)
where the expected real exchange rate is assumed to evolve as follows:
Z
e
ch;t+1 = ÁchZch;t+1 + (1 ¡ Ách)(Zch;t¡1 + 0:5¢Zch;t): (6)
Equations (5) and (6) di®er from the exchange rate equations used for the advanced economies
(shown in Appendix A). We include an additional term in each equation to account for the
e®ects of movements in the equilibrium exchange rate on the formation of exchange rate
expectations, as well as on the dynamics of the actual exchange rate. Equation (5) states
that the di®erence between the real exchange rate and its expected value is a function of the
real interest rate di®erential, the equilibrium real interest rate di®erential between the two
countries, and the rate of change of the equilibrium real exchange rate. In this way, strict
UIP does not hold in our model for China. Still, any deviation in the real interest rates across
the two countries should result in either an expected change in the exchange rate, a change
in the rate of depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate, and/or a deviation in the
equilibrium real interest rates in the two countries. Any other movement in the exchange rate
is captured by the residual in the equation (which can be thought of as a temporary shock to
in the tradables sector grows faster than in the non-tradables sector, the resulting higher wages in the tradables
sector will put upward pressure on wages in the non-tradables sector, resulting in a higher relative price of
non-tradables (i.e., a real appreciation of the exchange rate). For empirical evidence of Balassa-Samuelson
e®ects, see Ricci et al. (2008), among others.
8the risk premium).
As shown in Equation (6), in this \hybrid" version of UIP, the expected real exchange rate
is not fully model-consistent, but also depends in part on past values of the real exchange rate.
And, in contrast to the expectations-formation process for the G-3 economies, the expected
real exchange rate for China is also a function of movements in the equilibrium real exchange
rate. The equation for China's equilibrium real exchange rate, which also di®ers from that
used in the G-3 economies, is presented in the next section.
2.2 Stochastic processes
As part of the model structure, exogenous stochastic processes that govern the path of the
unobservable variables are also speci¯ed. More speci¯cally, exogenous stochastic processes
for potential output, the equilibrium real interest rate, the equilibrium real exchange rate,
and the equilibrium level of the real oil price are speci¯ed. We ¯rst present two equations
that describe the process for potential output. The ¯rst equation relates the level of potential
output to its own lagged value, its quarterly growth rate, and the rate of in°ation in real oil
prices as follows:







ch;t¡j ) + "
Y
ch;t (7)
where Y is the level of potential output, and gY/4 is the quarterly growth rate of potential.
Equation (7) also includes a disturbance term that can cause permanent shifts in the level of
potential output. The relationship between potential output and oil prices is such that higher
in°ation in real oil prices is expected to result in a permanent decline in the level of potential
output.











Therefore, the growth rate of potential can diverge from its steady-state growth rate following
a disturbance, and it is assumed that it will return to steady state gradually, with a speed
of return based on (1-¿). Thus, there can be shocks to both the level and the growth rate
of potential output in our model. Shocks to the level of potential output can be permanent,
whereas shocks to the growth rate result in highly persistent deviations in potential growth
from the long-run steady-state growth rate.
9Equation (9) de¯nes the equilibrium real interest rate as a function of the steady-state
real interest rate level:
Rch;t = ½chR
ss
ch + (1 ¡ ½ch)Rch;t¡1 + "
R
ch;t: (9)
The above speci¯cation allows for persistent deviations in the equilibrium real interest rate
from its steady-state value in response to a stochastic shock.
Equation (10) relates the equilibrium level of the money supply to its steady-state value:
¢Mi;t = ³i¢M
ss
i + (1 ¡ ³i)¢Mi;t¡1 + "
¢M
i;t ; (10)









Next, we turn to the process for the evolution of the equilibrium exchange rate in China,
an important equation in our model. As shown in Appendix A, the equilibrium exchange
rate in the benchmark model is assumed to follow a random walk. As discussed earlier, this
assumption is clearly not appropriate in the case of China. Instead, for China, we assume
that the rate of change of the equilibrium exchange rate is a function of its own lagged value
and the deviation of the growth rate of potential output from its steady-state value as follows:
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ch;t: (12)
The deviation of the growth rate of potential output from its steady-state value can be
thought of as a \catch-up" term, and its inclusion in Equation (12) is intended to capture the
link between ongoing productivity growth in the tradables sector in China and the sustained
appreciation of its equilibrium real exchange rate.12 Potential output growth shocks are thus
transmitted to the Chinese economy through their e®ects on the real exchange rate. This is
in contrast to the framework for the advanced economies, where shocks to potential output
growth are transmitted to the rest of the economy via a cross-correlation between shocks to
potential output growth and shocks to the output gap intended to capture the e®ects of the
12This type of Balassa-Samuelson result linking productivity growth in the tradables sector to a real ex-
change rate appreciation is typically found in 2-goods models. However, our framework is °exible enough to
enable us to capture this channel, which we believe is an important one for China.
10former shocks on aggregate demand via their in°uence on expected permanent income.13
3 Estimation
3.1 Estimation methodology
Our model is estimated using a Bayesian approach building on the methodology used in
Carabenciov et al. (2008). In contrast to that study, however, we adopt a 2-step estimation
procedure. First, we estimate the model for the G-3 economies as in Carabenciov et al. (2008),
using data over the period 1994Q1{2008Q3. Second, we impose the posterior estimates from
this ¯rst stage on the parameters for the G-3 economies and then estimate the global model,
allowing only the parameters of the Chinese economy to be estimated. We adopt this approach
because of the technical di±culties involved in estimating all of the parameters in the 4-country
model at once.
For each country, we use the following data series in our estimation: real GDP, a short-
term interest rate, consumer prices, and exchange rates. In addition, for the G-3 economies
we use data on the unemployment rate, and for the United States we use a measure of bank
lending tightness that is based on data from the Federal Reserve Board's quarterly Senior
Loan O±cer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. We also use data on world oil prices.
Appendix C provides more details on the sources of the data and on the variable de¯nitions.
In the second stage of our estimation, we use data for the Chinese economy over the period
from 2000Q1 to 2008Q3. We use a shorter sample period for China because data prior to the
year 2000 are not very informative for estimating the key relationships in our model, given the
signi¯cant structural changes in the Chinese economy since the 1990s. And, while economic
reforms have continued in China since 2000, they have been more modest.
The methodology that we use allows us to jointly estimate the model's behavioural pa-
rameters and the stochastic processes that govern the low-frequency movements in the data.
We do not need to pre-¯lter the data, and so we do not lose important information contained
in the trends. We use Bayesian methods and are hence able to incorporate the information
from our priors, appropriately weighted, with the information contained in the sample. As
previously mentioned, this approach is particularly useful when estimating a model over a
short sample period where some parameters may be weakly identi¯ed by the data. In the case
of China, the data may not be very informative for certain parameters, because of changes
to the exchange rate and monetary policy regimes over the sample period. This framework
also enables us to capture heterogeneity across countries, because both the priors and sample
periods used in the estimation can vary across countries.
13See Carabenciov et al. (2008) for more details.
113.2 Parameter estimates
In establishing our priors for the structural parameters for the Chinese equations in our model,
we use the priors for the G-3 economies set out in Carabenciov et al. (2008) as a starting
point. We then make adjustments where needed to capture those aspects of the Chinese
macroeconomy that we would expect to be di®erent. The priors and estimated results are
shown in Appendix D.
The only parameter whose prior we modify in the Chinese IS curve (Equation (1)) is ¯6,
which captures the degree of openness of the economy. We increase the prior on ¯6 to 0.4,
to re°ect the fact that the Chinese economy is more open than the economies of the United
States, the euro area, and Japan.14 The posterior estimate for ¯6 indicates that the data are
supportive of our prior. As such, we would expect foreign demand shocks to have a larger
impact on the Chinese economy than on the G-3 economies, all else equal.
The prior for ¯5, the coe±cient that relates M2 growth to the output gap, is set lower
than the prior for the impact of the interest rate gap on the Chinese output gap. This re°ects
the fact that M2 growth is more volatile than the real interest rate gap.
Even though the priors for the other parameters in the Chinese IS curve are the same as
those for the advanced economies, the parameter estimates for both ¯2 and ¯3 are not. Indeed,
the posterior estimate for ¯2, the coe±cient on the lead of the output gap, is substantially
lower in China. This suggests that agents are much less forward looking in China than in more
advanced economies, perhaps because ¯nancial markets are not as developed, and agents are
less able to smooth consumption over time.
Turning to the parameters in Equation (2), the Phillips curve, we lower the prior on ¸2
slightly to re°ect the fact that, over recent history, we have seen a persistently positive output
gap in China, which has been met with little in the way of persistently elevated in°ation. We
take this as evidence that the in°ation process in China is less responsive to °uctuations in
the output gap than is the case in typical industrialized economies. Our posterior estimate
for this parameter falls well below our prior, thus con¯rming our intuition. Next, ¸1, the
coe±cient on the lead of in°ation, is smaller in our model for China, relative to the estimates
for the other G-3 economies, suggesting that in°ation expectations are less well anchored
in China. This result is not surprising, given the evolving nature of the monetary policy
framework in China.
As discussed in section 2.1, we have made one important modi¯cation to the interest rate
rule for China (Equation (3)), in that we include an exchange rate term to account for the
fact that the authorities put considerable weight on stabilizing the exchange rate when setting
monetary policy. This exchange rate term measures deviations of the rate of depreciation of
14The prior on ¯6 for the G-3 economies ranges between 0.03 and 0.05.
12the bilateral exchange rate of the Chinese RMB (relative to the U.S. dollar) from its targeted
value, and °5 is the coe±cient that captures the importance the authorities accord to this
term when setting policy rates.15 We assign a prior of 0.20 to °5, which is slightly lower than
our prior for the weight that the authorities put on deviations of in°ation from target.16 This
seems reasonable, given that the authorities are unlikely to have to put a very large weight on
stabilizing the exchange rate when setting policy interest rates, since extensive capital controls
were in place over the sample period in China. The posterior estimate for °5, at around 0.11,
suggests that policy rates in China respond somewhat less to changes in the exchange rate
than we would have anticipated, perhaps because capital controls were particularly e®ective
over the sample period and/or because other monetary policy instruments were also used to
stabilize the exchange rate.17
There are two other di®erences between the interest rate reaction function in China and
that used for the more advanced economies. First, the prior on °2, the weight on deviations
of expected in°ation from target, is set lower in China because it is assumed that the Chinese
central bank is less concerned with in°ation movements than their counterparts in the United
States, the euro area, and Japan. The posterior estimate for °2 is actually lower than the
prior, thus providing support for this view. Second, we calibrate °1, the coe±cient on the
lagged interest rate, because we believe that the data are not very informative in determining
the value for this parameter. Policy interest rates in China did not move much over the early
part of the sample (from 2000 to 2005), most likely because the authorities were concerned
about the fragility of the banking sector. We thus believe that the posterior estimate for
this parameter overestimates the degree of interest rate smoothing in the Chinese interest
rate reaction function over the sample period, and in particular since 2006, when the Chinese
authorities started changing policy rates much more frequently.
Concerning the parameter estimates for the second lever of monetary policy in China, the
target for M2 growth, it appears that the authorities assign approximately equal weight to
their output-gap and in°ation objectives when setting their target for M2 growth (posterior
estimates of &2 and &3 are virtually identical).
15This coe±cient is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, since values for °5 should be non-negative,
but need not have a constrained positive domain.
16Our prior for the weight the authorities put on deviations of in°ation from target is 0.3 (i.e., (1-°1)°2).
17Many studies in the literature treat China as having a purely ¯xed exchange rate regime (for example, see
Straub and Thimann 2009). In our model, this would entail a very high value for °5, alongside a value of zero
for °2 and °3. We do not feel that such a speci¯cation adequately captures the Chinese situation, since capital
controls and extensive sterilization e®orts have given the Chinese authorities the ability to partially control
in°ation and output over the sample period, while still exerting control over the exchange rate. We tried
estimating our model with a completely ¯xed exchange rate, and the resulting model ¯t for nominal interest
rates was very poor; the model properties were also suspect, since policy could not respond to movements in
in°ation or the output gap.
13One ¯nal coe±cient that is worthy of mention is Ã, the coe±cient on the catch-up term in
the Chinese equilibrium real exchange rate equation. We set a prior of 0.12 for this coe±cient,
with a tight standard deviation of 0.01. To assist with the interpretation of this parameter,
consider a potential growth rate of 9 per cent (quarter-over-quarter, at annualized rates) in
China. This growth rate di®ers from our assumed steady-state growth rate of 5 per cent
for China. Thus, with Chinese potential growth at 9 per cent, we would expect the Chinese
RMB to appreciate against the U.S. dollar by roughly 0.5 per cent per quarter (in real terms),
ceteris paribus. The degree of appreciation of the real equilibrium exchange rate in our model
is therefore in line with what is included in work by Straub and Thimann (2009). This
appreciation would continue until the Chinese economy had converged to its steady-state
growth rate.
In Appendix D, we provide the same information for the standard deviation of the struc-
tural shocks as we did for our coe±cient estimates.18 The prior mean on the standard deviation
of the real equilibrium interest rate variable is higher for China than elsewhere.
Taken together, our parameter estimates indicate that the output-gap process in China is
heavily dependent on foreign demand, and is less forward looking than in a typical advanced
economy. Chinese in°ation in our model is less in°uenced by the output gap than elsewhere.
Monetary policy is conducted using two instruments, and responds to three variables. And
our posterior estimates underscore an important role for the exchange rate, in both reaction
functions.
4 What Shocks Drive the Chinese Economy?
In this section, we use the estimated model to analyze the e®ects of the key structural
shocks, both domestic and foreign, on the Chinese economy, and compare them to the e®ects
in the advanced economies. We ¯rst present impulse-response functions (IRFs) for a selection
of the model's most important shocks. We then provide a decomposition of the forecast error
variance for the endogenous variables.
4.1 Impulse-response analysis
Figures 2 to 10 in Appendix E plot the IRFs for a selection of the model's most important
shocks.19 For each shock presented, we show the IRFs for both China and one of the advanced
countries, to highlight the di®erences in how shocks are transmitted between the two types
of economies.
18All shock terms are assumed to follow an inverted gamma distribution, which guarantees a positive
variance.
19All impulse responses shown in Figures 2 through 10 are for a temporary 1 per cent shock (i.e., lasting
one period).
14Figure 2 shows the e®ects of a Chinese demand shock on the key variables in the Chinese
economy. As expected, a positive shock to the output gap results in an increase in the Chinese
output gap, a rise in in°ation, an increase in the nominal and real interest rates, and a real
appreciation of the Chinese RMB. The e®ect of a domestic demand shock in China is broadly
similar to the e®ects of a domestic demand shock in the G-3 economies. Figure 3 depicts the
e®ects of a U.S. demand shock. There are three important di®erences between the U.S. and
Chinese responses. First, the response of the real exchange rate in China is more long-lived
after a demand shock in China, as a result of the persistence in China's real exchange rate.
Second, in°ation responds by less than in the United States, in part because the Phillips curve
in China is less sensitive to movements in the output gap than elsewhere, and in part because
of the larger currency appreciation that takes place in China, which tends to dampen the
in°ationary impact of the positive demand shock. Third, the Chinese authorities respond to
this shock by contracting M2 growth, which implies that interest rates need not increase by as
much as they do elsewhere in order to close the output gap. This result { that interest rates
respond somewhat less to demand shocks in China than is the case in developed economies {
is consistent with the relatively sluggish movement of Chinese nominal interest rates in recent
years (see Figure 13 in Appendix J).
The response of the Chinese economy to a negative domestic in°ation shock, shown in
Figure 4, is qualitatively similar to the response of the G-3 economies (Figure 5 focuses on
the U.S. response to a domestic in°ation shock). Monetary authorities respond quickly to
the fall in in°ation by cutting the benchmark interest rate, and increasing M2 growth. These
responses cause an output gap to open up. The exchange rate depreciates, due to the negative
interest rate di®erential that emerges, providing further upward pressure on the output gap.
The positive output gap creates in°ationary pressures, thereby triggering the adjustment
back to equilibrium. One important di®erence between the Chinese and U.S. responses to
this negative in°ation shock is the amount of excess supply that is required to bring in°ation
back to target. As Figure 4 shows, the Chinese economy requires an output gap that is
roughly double the size of the U.S. gap in order to bring in°ation to target. This is because
in°ation in China responds a good deal less to movements in the output gap than is the case
elsewhere in the model. This result is consistent with recent historical outcomes in China,
where we have seen a situation of excess demand emerge over the past several years without
giving rise to high in°ation.20
The response of the Chinese economy to a shock to potential output growth di®ers
markedly from that of the G-3 economies. As Figure 7 shows, the euro area output gap
starts to increase immediately in response to a shock to potential output growth. This move-
20Note that our measure of Chinese in°ation, headline CPI, does not include housing price in°ation.
15ment in the output gap arises as a result of the cross-correlation between shocks to the output
gap and potential output growth that we have imposed for the euro area. As discussed earlier,
this cross-correlation is intended to capture the fact that aggregate demand should increase
even before potential output starts to rise, in response to a persistent positive shock to po-
tential output growth, because of the associated increase in expected permanent income (i.e.,
households and businesses will increase spending immediately in response to the shock, thus
creating a positive output gap). Hence, for a typical advanced economy, the output gap in-
creases immediately in reaction to the shock, and therefore the path of the other key variables
in response to the shock is similar to that following a demand shock.
For China, we do not think that the channel through which a shock to potential growth
a®ects aggregate demand is via its e®ect on permanent income. In our view, credit-constrained
Chinese households are less likely to be able to borrow to increase their consumption, to the
extent that the increase in consumption is ¯nanced through debt. For this reason, we have
not imposed this cross-correlation of shocks for China. Instead, the channel of transmission
for a potential growth shock in China is through the exchange rate, rather than through the
output gap. Indeed, a positive shock to potential output growth creates a positive catch-
up term in the equilibrium exchange rate equation, thus causing a steady appreciation of
the equilibrium exchange rate. This channel is designed to capture Balassa-Samuleson-type
e®ects in China, where large productivity shocks in the tradables sector are expected to lead
to a steady appreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate. And, over time, as the Chinese
authorities allow the exchange rate to adjust, this should translate into a gradual appreciation
of the actual exchange rate.
Thus, as Figure 7 shows, the creation of a positive output gap in the euro area causes
a rise in in°ation, an increase in the policy rate, and a real appreciation of the euro. In
contrast, as Figure 6 shows, a shock to potential output growth in China causes a wedge
to open between the potential growth rate and its steady-state level, leading to a gradual
and persistent appreciation of both the equilibrium and the actual real exchange rates. The
sustained appreciation of the exchange rate gives rise to some de°ation, and the authorities
respond by enacting stimulative monetary policy.
Figures 8 and 9, respectively, compare the Chinese and euro area responses to a 1 per
cent U.S. demand shock. The foreign shock has a much larger e®ect on the Chinese economy,
which results from the fact that the Chinese economy is much more open.
Figure 10 shows the response of the Chinese economy to a shock to M2 growth. The
shock is not very persistent, and as a result it does not have a long-lived e®ect on Chinese
output. The peak response of the output gap to a 1 per cent shock to M2 growth is a mere
0.1 per cent. Thus, the sensitivity of Chinese output to M2 growth shocks is smaller than
16with respect to interest rate shocks. This is to be expected, given that credit-growth shocks
are likely to be considerably larger, and less persistent, than are interest rate shocks.21
4.2 Variance decomposition
In Appendix F, we provide the contribution of each of the structural shocks to the forecast
error variance of the Chinese endogenous variables at several di®erent horizons. In Appen-
dices G{I, we provide the same information for the endogenous variables of each of the G-3
economies, to compare the importance of the di®erent shocks in the Chinese economy relative
to the advanced economies.
First, we examine the key shocks that drive the output gap. In the short run, a large
proportion of the variation in the output gap in all four economies is attributable to domestic
demand shocks ("y). Consistent with the impulse-response analysis, the variance decompo-
sition suggests that foreign demand shocks are a more important driver of the output gap
in China than in the advanced economies. In addition to foreign demand shocks, shocks to
Chinese M2 growth ("¢M
ch ) as well as Chinese in°ation ("¼
ch) play an important role in explain-
ing most of the remaining short-run variation in the Chinese output gap. For the advanced
economies, domestic shocks account for most of the short-run variation in the output gaps.
In the medium term, domestic in°ation and interest rate shocks ("I) become increasingly
important, and there is also an important role for exchange rate shocks ("z), both between
the domestic economy and the United States and in the RMB/U.S.-dollar exchange rate. As
a result of the persistence in the equilibrium exchange rate process, and the control that the
Chinese authorities exert on the real exchange rate, shocks to Chinese exchange rates have
an important impact on the Chinese economy, as well as on the other economies in our global
model.
Next, we consider the key shocks that explain the variation in in°ation rates. For all four
economies, domestic in°ation shocks dominate all other shocks as the short- and medium-term
source of variation, and more so in China than elsewhere. Given that in°ation expectations
are assumed to be less forward looking in China, it is not surprising that domestic in°ation
shocks play such an important role in explaining the variation in Chinese in°ation. In other
words, in°ation is modelled as a fairly backward-looking and sluggish process in China, and
thus large in°ation shocks are needed in order to replicate the volatility in the Chinese in°ation
data. This ¯nding is consistent with the results of estimated DSGE models, such as in Smets
and Wouters (2003), where large price-markup shocks are needed to replicate the volatility
in in°ation rates that is present in the data.
21In Appendix D, we show that shocks to M2 growth ("¢M) are much larger than shocks to interest rates
("I
ch).
17Although in°ation shocks remain the key driver of in°ation in all four economies in the
medium term, they decrease in importance over time, especially in the advanced economies,
and other shocks take on a more prominent role. For the euro area and Japan, shocks to
equilibrium exchange rates become a more important source of variation in the medium term.
Turning to policy interest rates, our results suggest that variation in Chinese rates is
largely driven by shocks to domestic in°ation, and to a lesser degree by shocks to the Chinese
exchange rate. This is in contrast to the advanced economies, where domestic monetary policy
shocks are more important in explaining the variation in policy rates.
Concerning the shocks that drive exchange rates in the model, it comes as little sur-
prise that the real e®ective exchange rate is driven almost exclusively by shocks to domestic
equilibrium exchange rates, as well as those of trading partners.
5 How Well Does the Model for China Perform over
History?
5.1 Historical decomposition of the key Chinese variables
In Figures 11 through 14 in Appendix J, we provide the historical decomposition of four key
Chinese variables into their main determinants based on the model's estimates: the output
gap, the in°ation rate, the interest rate, and the M2 growth rate.
Figure 11 depicts the evolution of the Chinese output gap. The model suggests that
external demand has played an important role in explaining movements in the Chinese output
gap since 2000, particularly during certain episodes. For instance, external demand was the
key factor driving the positive output gap in China in the period leading up to mid-2001.
And, when global demand slowed in 2001, external pressure on the Chinese output gap turned
negative. Another important determinant of the Chinese output gap over history has been the
real exchange rate gap, or the deviation of the actual real exchange rate from its equilibrium
value. For virtually the entire sample, the model estimates that the Chinese equilibrium real
exchange rate has been stronger than the actual real exchange rate, and that this exchange
rate gap has put upward pressure on the output gap. A negative real interest rate gap has
also played a role recently; the model interprets rates as having been stimulative through
early 2008. This is not surprising, since rates were very slow to respond to the excess demand
conditions that began to appear in mid-2005. Interestingly, though, the model suggests that
contractionary M2 growth o®set some of the excess stimulus provided by the Chinese interest
rate policy, in the post-2007 period. M2 growth was also allowed to expand rapidly in the
post-2001 period as external demand acted as a drag on the Chinese output gap.
The historical decompositions of in°ation and the interest rate are shown in Figures 12
18and 13, respectively. The in°ation process appears to be quite volatile in China, and much
of the volatility is captured by in°ation shocks, rather than the endogenous variables in the
model. The exchange rate gap, however, does play a small role throughout the sample period,
particularly in accounting for some of the upward pressure on in°ation. The same is true for
the output gap in the latter part of the sample period. Note that both of the episodes
of elevated in°ation (late 2003 and late 2007) were driven almost exclusively by food-price
in°ation, which was driven by supply shocks. As such, we should not expect the model to
explain the behaviour of in°ation particularly well over these periods.22
As Figure 13 shows, there has been substantial inertia in the interest rate process in
China over the sample period. Towards the end of the sample period, authorities did increase
interest rates, and this seems to have been driven by in°ation considerations. Figure 14 shows
the historical decomposition of the M2, or credit growth, equation. Examining the period
following the 2001 recession in the United States, we see that the Chinese authorities opted
for expansionary money growth in response to low in°ation rates. Later in the sample, in
response to elevated in°ation alongside a substantial positive output gap, it is clear that the
authorities attempted to slow the economy by reigning in M2 growth from early 2007 through
mid-2008.
5.2 The evolution of the Chinese output gap, real interest rate gap,
and real exchange rate gap over history
In Figure 15 in Appendix K, we provide the model's interpretation of four key unobservable
variables: the output gap, the real interest rate gap, the real exchange rate gap, and the real
money gap. Because of the estimation technique that we employ, these gaps are computed
using the entire state-space of the model, thus providing a much richer, model-consistent,
view of these variables than would a simple ¯ltering of the data.
Starting with the real exchange rate gap, the model suggests that, from 2002 onwards,
the level of the Chinese RMB was above its equilibrium level. Initially, the gap was relatively
modest. However, starting in the second half of 2004, the real exchange rate gap began
to widen. Perhaps in response to this mounting pressure for the RMB to appreciate, the
Chinese authorities liberalized their exchange rate regime in July of 2005, allowing for a one-
time appreciation of 2.1 per cent. The stated policy from this point forward was that the
RMB would follow a managed °oat against a basket of international currencies.
22It has been argued that Chinese in°ation should be somewhat more responsive to °uctuations in the
output gap, since the exchange rate is managed. However, this need not be the case if sterilization measures
are widely used, as in China. Also, as noted previously, our measure of in°ation does not include housing
price in°ation, which has been rising rapidly in China recently.
19The model's interpretation of the real exchange rate gap over this period suggests that the
change of policy from mid-2005 through mid-2006 had no discernible impact in reducing the
size of the gap. In fact, the real exchange rate gap continued to grow until mid-2006. Perhaps
as a result of this continuing pressure on the Chinese currency, the authorities began to allow
a more rapid appreciation of the RMB, beginning in late 2006. A more rapid pace of nominal
appreciation, alongside a pickup in in°ation, arrested the widening of the real exchange rate
gap. By mid-2008, the gap had been reduced substantially.
Turning to the model's interpretation of the real interest rate gap, it is clear that, since
mid-2003, policy rates have been stimulative. Notably, the movements in this gap are pri-
marily attributable to variations in in°ation, since nominal rates over the sample period were
relatively unchanged.
Clearly, the real exchange rate and real interest rate gaps have played a pivotal role in
shaping the path of the output gap. From early 2002 until early 2005, the Chinese economy
was in a situation of mild excess supply, but, since then, the output gap has turned positive.
In our view, the Chinese authorities have the ability to mobilize factors of production in an
exceptionally timely and e±cient manner. In the period leading up to 2005, it was relatively
easy to shift productive resources from the agricultural sector to the urban industrial sector
that services China's growing export market. Thus, high growth could be achieved without
encountering a situation of excess demand. From mid-2005 onwards, the model indicates that
the Chinese economy moved into a situation of excess demand, which appears to have been
driven by the negative real interest rate gap mentioned earlier, and also by a widening real
exchange rate gap that fuelled export growth. It is also plausible that some of the early gains
in potential output growth associated with resource reallocation by the Chinese authorities
have become harder to replicate in recent years, as resources have become relatively more
scarce.
6 Conclusions
In order to better understand the shocks that drive the Chinese economy, and how these
shocks are transmitted to the large advanced economies, we incorporate China into a global
model, based on the framework developed by Carabenciov et al. (2008) for the G-3 economies.
The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques, which helps address the challenges posed
when attempting to estimate a model using Chinese data, namely a short sample period and
data with limited information content.
Our paper yields several interesting ¯ndings. First, we ¯nd that foreign demand shocks
have more important e®ects on the Chinese economy than on the large advanced economies.
Moreover, a historical decomposition of our model-based estimate of the Chinese output gap
20suggests that external demand has played an important role in explaining movements in the
Chinese output gap over the past decade. These results are not surprising, given that China is
a very open economy. They also highlight the importance of modelling the Chinese economy
in a global setting that can properly account for key linkages across the major economies.
Second, we ¯nd that Chinese shocks, particularly real equilibrium exchange rate shocks, are
not only a key driver of the Chinese economy, but they also play an important role in the
other advanced economies. This is consistent with the view that shocks to the Chinese
economy have had important e®ects on the global economy in recent years, and underscores
the importance of including China in global models given its key role in the world economy.
Third, our results suggest that the Chinese economy adjusts more slowly to shocks compared
to the large advanced economies, because monetary policy is less e®ective and shocks have
a more persistent e®ect on the real exchange rate. And ¯nally, our model displays sensible
properties and does a reasonably good job of replicating the key dynamics of the Chinese
economy, thus suggesting that our approach in modelling the exchange rate and monetary
policy process in China is appropriate.
China's exchange rate and monetary policy regimes in macroeconomic models are inter-
esting, albeit challenging, topics for ongoing research. Indeed, many studies in the literature
treat China as having a purely ¯xed exchange rate regime. However, in theory, such an
approach does not allow monetary policy to respond to movements in the output gap and
in°ation. Over the past several years, Chinese monetary policy has clearly responded to such
movements while still exerting control over the exchange rate. This has been accomplished
through the use of capital controls, as well as extensive sterilization measures. Explicitly
incorporating these processes into macroeconomic models of the Chinese economy would be
an interesting topic for future research.
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23Appendix A: Benchmark Country Model
Key behavioural equations
Output-gap equation:






















Monetary reaction function equation:
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25Appendix B: The Exchange Rate
Figure 1: Movements in the Chinese Exchange Rate
26Appendix C: Data De¯nitions
China
GDP China Real quarterly GDP (SAAR, Bil. of Chinese renminbi, Base year=2000)
Interest rates People's Bank of China 1-year base lending rate (per cent)
(period average).
CPI China Consumer price index (SA, 1994=100)
Exchange rate Period averages; increase is depreciation
United States
GDP U.S. Gross domestic product (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2000.Dollars)
Interest rates Federal Open Market Committee: Fed funds target rate (per cent)
(period average)
CPI U.S. Consumer price index (SA, 1982{84=100)
Unemployment Civilian unemployment rate (SA, per cent)
Bank lending tightening (BLT)
Average of (all expressed in per cent):
FRB Sr O±cers Survey: Banks Tightening C.I. Loans to Large Firms
FRB Sr O±cers Survey: Banks Tightening C.I. Loans to Small Firms
FRB Sr Loan O® Survey: Tightening Standards for Comm. Real Estate
FRB Sr Loan Survey: Res. Mortgage: Net Share, Banks Tightening
Euro area
GDP Euro Area 15 Gross domestic product (SA/WDA, Mil.Chn.00.Euros)
Interest rates Euro Area 11-15: 3-Months EURIBOR Rate (AVG, per cent)
CPI Euro Area 15 Monetary Union index of consumer prices (SA, 2005=100)
Unemployment Euro Area15: Unemployment rate (SA, per cent)
Exchange rates Period averages; increase is depreciation
27Japan
GDP Japan Gross domestic product (SAAR, Bil.Chn.2000.Yen)
Interest rates Japan: Call rate: Uncollateralized 3-month (EOP, per cent)
CPI Japan Consumer price index (SA, 2005=100)
Unemployment Japan: Unemployment rate (SA, per cent)
Exchange rates Period averages; increase is depreciation
Oil Price
Oil price Crude oil (petroleum), simple average of three spot prices; Dated Brent,
West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh, U.S.-dollar per barrel
(period average)
Real E®ective
Exchange rates Weighted averages of the bilateral exchange rates.
Weights are based on bilateral trade data from the
International Monetary Fund (2006).
The rates in the in°ation equations are de¯ned with import weights,
while the rates in the output-gap equations use total trade
(imports + exports) weights.
Foreign output gaps Weighted averages of the foreign output gaps.
Weights are based on bilateral trade data (exports) from the
International Monetary Fund (2006).
28Appendix D: Results of Posterior Maximization
Prior Posterior
Mean S.D. Distribution Mode S.D.
IS curve
¯ch;1 0.750 0.0500 Beta 0.6900 0.0509
¯ch;2 0.150 0.1000 Beta 0.0267 0.0292
¯ch;3 0.250 0.0500 Gamma 0.1939 0.0377
¯ch;4 0.100 0.0100 Gamma 0.0903 0.0089
¯ch;5 0.050 0.0100 Gamma 0.0348 0.0073
¯ch;6 0.400 0.0500 Gamma 0.4284 0.0513
Phillips curve
¸ch;1 0.500 0.0500 Beta 0.4894 0.0423
¸ch;2 0.200 0.0500 Gamma 0.1275 0.0343
¸ch;3 0.120 0.0500 Gamma 0.1394 0.0561
Monetary policy reaction functions
°ch;1 0.7 0 Beta 0.7 0
°ch;2 1.200 0.3000 Gamma 0.8042 0.1905
°ch;4 0.200 0.0500 Gamma 0.1864 0.0477
°ch;5 0.200 0.1000 Gamma 0.1139 0.0217
&ch;1 0.030 0.0050 Beta 0.0290 0.0049
&ch;2 0.500 0.0500 Gamma 0.4930 0.0494
&ch;3 0.500 0.0500 Gamma 0.4916 0.0493
&ch;4 0.250 0.0500 Gamma 0.2324 0.0469
Stochastic processes
gY ss
ch 5.000 0.2000 Normal 5.1251 0.1994
R
ss
ch 3.900 0.2000 Normal 4.0536 0.1766
½ch 0.900 0.0100 Beta 0.9011 0.0100
¿ch 0.030 0.0050 Beta 0.0245 0.0042
Ách 0.500 0.2000 Beta 0.7885 0.0346
·ch 0.050 0.0050 Beta 0.0493 0.0050
Ãch 0.120 0.0100 Gamma 0.1178 0.0098
!ch 0.900 0.0200 Beta 0.8802 0.0210
³ch 0.030 0.0050 Beta 0.0247 0.0042
Àch;1 0.002 0.0010 Gamma 0.0017 0.0010
Àch;2 0.002 0.0010 Gamma 0.0015 0.0009
¾ch 0.002 0.0010 Gamma 0.0013 0.0007
29Prior Posterior




ch 0.250 0.0300 Inverted gamma 0.3016 0.0438
"Y
ch 0.200 0.0500 Inverted gamma 0.1785 0.0386
"z
ch 1.500 0.2000 Inverted gamma 2.3343 0.2894
"¼
ch 1.000 Inf Inverted gamma 2.2972 0.2819
"R




ch 1.000 Inf Inverted gamma 0.4245 0.1490
"I
ch 0.500 Inf Inverted gamma 0.1085 0.0165
"
y
ch 0.300 Inf Inverted gamma 0.6284 0.0898
"LS
ch 0.500 Inf Inverted gamma 0.2204 0.0809
"¢M 1.000 0.2000 Inverted gamma 1.2882 0.2235
"¢M 3.000 0.5000 Inverted gamma 3.3086 0.3492
30Appendix E: Impulse-Response Functions
Y = Output gap
GROWTH = Growth of real GDP (q/q at annualized rates)
GROWTH4 BAR = Growth rate of potential output (average annual)
PIE4 = In°ation rate (average annual)
RS = Nominal interest rate
RR = Real interest rate
LZ = Real bilateral exchange rate (vs. U.S. dollar)
DM = Growth rate of money supply (China only)
REER T = Trade-weighted real e®ective exchange rate
UNR = Unemployment rate
BLT = Bank lending tightening (United States only)
LZ BAR = Equilibrium real exchange rate
Figure 2: Chinese Response to a Chinese Demand Shock





























































31Figure 3: U.S. Response to a U.S. Demand Shock






























































Figure 4: Chinese Response to a Chinese In°ation Shock























































32Figure 5: U.S. Response to a U.S. In°ation Shock





























































Figure 6: Chinese Response to a Chinese Potential Output Growth Shock























































33Figure 7: Euro Area Response to a Euro Area Potential Output Growth Shock



























































Figure 8: Chinese Response to a U.S. Demand Shock






























































34Figure 9: Euro Area Response to a U.S. Demand Shock
































































Figure 10: Chinese Response to a Chinese M2 (Credit Growth) Shock





























































35Appendix F: Variance Decomposition of Chinese
Variables
Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective
gap interest rate exchange rate gap interest rate exchange rate
t=0 t=4
"z
ch 0.00 0.06 22.75 0.13 "z
ch 8.23 0.10 20.75 9.59
"¼
ch 0.00 99.36 67.92 24.55 "¼
ch 11.27 97.58 59.28 27.55
"R
ch 0.00 0.00 5.27 0.01 "R
ch 0.73 0.00 1.85 0.09
"I
ch 0.00 0.18 1.88 5.00 "I
ch 0.29 0.35 1.59 4.39
"
y
ch 99.97 0.01 1.30 0.74 "
y
ch 55.29 0.60 1.24 1.01
"z
eu 0.00 0.01 0.00 22.88 "z
eu 0.07 0.03 0.01 18.92
"y
eu 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 "y
eu 1.91 0.03 0.08 0.01
"z
ja 0.00 0.12 0.00 43.36 "z
ja 0.00 0.13 0.00 35.61
"
y
ja 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 "
y
ja 1.56 0.03 0.08 0.00
"BLT
us 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.05 "BLT
us 0.12 0.18 5.55 0.21
"g
Y
us 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.03 "g
Y
us 0.08 0.13 3.90 0.15
"R
us 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.19 "R
us 0.89 0.03 1.70 0.04
"y
us 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 "y
us 3.48 0.10 0.80 0.00
"¢M
ch 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.25 "¢M
ch 14.62 0.17 0.29 0.34
Other shocks 0.00 0.22 0.44 2.79 Other shocks 1.44 0.52 2.87 2.09
t=8 t=20
"z
ch 6.02 0.33 11.32 22.78 "z
ch 6.50 0.49 11.65 55.21
"¼
ch 40.85 95.74 69.00 23.40 "¼
ch 58.42 93.39 68.57 8.29
"R
ch 0.45 0.01 1.05 0.06 "R
ch 0.27 0.01 0.79 0.02
"I
ch 0.47 0.53 1.10 3.56 "I
ch 1.72 1.27 1.15 1.35
"
y
ch 31.94 0.87 2.29 0.96 "
y
ch 17.65 0.91 2.82 0.38
"z
eu 0.19 0.05 0.05 16.04 "z
eu 0.18 0.06 0.12 11.08
"y
eu 1.43 0.07 0.22 0.02 "y
eu 0.96 0.08 0.25 0.01
"z
ja 0.01 0.13 0.00 30.61 "z
ja 0.02 0.13 0.04 21.97
"
y
ja 1.06 0.06 0.18 0.00 "
y
ja 0.64 0.06 0.20 0.00
"BLT
us 2.22 0.57 5.35 0.28 "BLT
us 2.71 1.16 4.74 0.10
"g
Y
us 1.56 0.40 3.76 0.19 "g
Y
us 1.91 0.82 3.33 0.07
"R
us 0.58 0.04 1.58 0.05 "R
us 0.44 0.06 1.30 0.03
"y
us 2.57 0.21 0.83 0.01 "y
us 1.53 0.24 0.74 0.01
"¢M
ch 8.55 0.28 0.74 0.35 "¢M
ch 4.89 0.30 1.01 0.14
Other shocks 2.12 0.71 2.55 1.67 Other shocks 2.16 1.01 3.28 1.34
36Appendix G: Variance Decomposition of Euro Area
Variables
Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective
gap interest rate exchange rate gap interest rate exchange rate
t=0 t=4
"z
eu 0.12 13.85 9.51 94.11 "z
eu 8.18 13.74 6.41 93.43
"¼
eu 0.08 81.70 38.33 0.13 "¼
eu 9.88 72.71 25.29 0.05
"R
eu 0.05 0.00 3.01 0.00 "R
eu 0.99 0.01 4.14 0.00
"I
eu 0.28 0.29 35.53 0.08 "I
eu 15.15 1.74 11.83 0.02
"y
eu 99.37 0.26 5.74 0.12 "y
eu 57.19 3.25 20.94 0.10
"z
ch 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.12 "z
ch 0.54 0.08 0.09 0.81
"¼
ch 0.02 0.49 1.84 0.38 "¼
ch 1.94 1.71 9.54 0.61
"I
ch 0.00 0.10 0.34 0.08 "I
ch 0.33 0.32 1.87 0.09
"
y
ch 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.01 "
y
ch 0.31 0.16 1.03 0.02
"z
ja 0.01 0.62 0.36 4.31 "z
ja 0.57 0.59 0.20 4.37
"BLT
us 0.01 0.19 0.89 0.19 "BLT
us 1.17 0.85 5.42 0.18
"g
Y
us 0.01 0.14 0.62 0.14 "g
Y
us 0.82 0.60 3.81 0.13
"R
us 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02 "R
us 0.71 0.13 0.77 0.07
"y
us 0.02 0.04 0.25 0.01 "y
us 1.49 0.24 1.61 0.01
"g
RPOIL
us 0.01 1.47 2.83 0.00 "g
RPOIL
us 0.15 2.59 4.31 0.00
"g
RPOIL
us 0.00 0.59 0.01 0.01 "g
RPOIL
us 0.05 0.91 1.39 0.00
Other shocks 0.01 0.19 0.34 0.31 Other shocks 0.51 0.39 1.34 0.10
t=8 t=20
"z
eu 10.08 13.38 5.17 92.62 "z
eu 9.30 13.26 5.15 90.47
"¼
eu 17.09 70.01 18.41 0.03 "¼
eu 16.37 69.16 17.84 0.01
"R
eu 0.87 0.02 2.96 0.00 "R
eu 0.87 0.04 2.59 0.00
"I
eu 12.99 2.41 12.00 0.02 "I
eu 12.13 2.43 10.69 0.01
"y
eu 41.72 3.42 17.97 0.05 "y
eu 38.19 3.49 15.67 0.02
"z
ch 2.75 0.18 0.92 1.71 "z
ch 5.63 0.46 3.66 4.40
"¼
ch 3.69 2.36 13.27 0.67 "¼
ch 4.61 2.47 13.41 0.35
"I
ch 0.57 0.48 2.82 0.09 "I
ch 0.67 0.53 3.13 0.05
"
y
ch 0.39 0.24 1.42 0.02 "
y
ch 0.39 0.24 1.39 0.02
"z
ja 0.68 0.57 0.18 4.40 "z
ja 0.64 0.57 0.18 4.42
"BLT
us 2.86 1.42 8.97 0.14 "BLT
us 3.42 1.58 9.76 0.06
"g
Y
us 2.01 0.99 6.30 0.10 "g
Y
us 2.40 1.11 6.86 0.04
"R
us 1.31 0.16 0.87 0.05 "R
us 1.33 0.19 0.94 0.02
"y
us 1.47 0.32 1.98 0.01 "y
us 1.35 0.33 1.78 0.00
"g
RPOIL
us 0.63 2.51 3.04 0.00 "g
RPOIL
us 0.78 2.53 2.94 0.00
"g
RPOIL
us 0.19 1.03 1.83 0.00 "g
RPOIL
us 0.93 1.06 1.87 0.00
Other shocks 0.71 0.49 1.90 0.08 Other shocks 0.98 0.54 2.14 0.11
37Appendix H: Variance Decomposition of Japanese
Variables
Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective
gap interest rate exchange rate gap interest rate exchange rate
t=0 t=4
"z
ja 0.00 10.22 8.47 94.78 "z
ja 2.85 11.90 12.89 94.62
"¼
ja 0.00 88.54 44.27 0.83 "¼
ja 3.14 83.77 57.98 0.77
"R
ja 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.01 "R
ja 0.22 0.01 1.19 0.00
"I
ja 0.00 0.09 42.71 0.30 "I
ja 4.55 0.29 13.69 0.10
"
y
ja 99.99 0.11 2.38 0.07 "
y
ja 83.27 1.50 7.63 0.09
"z
ch 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01 "z
ch 1.02 0.09 0.28 0.19
"¼
ch 0.00 0.25 0.48 0.84 "¼
ch 2.20 0.56 1.93 1.07
"I
ch 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 "I
ch 0.37 0.12 0.47 0.15
"z
eu 0.00 0.20 0.17 2.51 "z
eu 0.04 0.24 0.30 2.54
"BLT
us 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.22 "BLT
us 0.62 0.14 0.56 0.19
"g
Y
us 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.15 "g
Y
us 0.44 0.10 0.40 0.13
"g
RPOIL
us 0.00 0.28 0.72 0.00 "g
RPOIL
us 0.04 0.82 1.60 0.00
Other shocks 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.13 Other shocks 1.24 0.47 1.08 0.15
t=8 t=20
"z
ja 4.53 11.84 12.47 94.59 "z
ja 4.88 11.82 11.82 93.66
"¼
ja 11.24 82.99 56.47 0.54 "¼
ja 14.31 82.77 53.56 0.22
"R
ja 0.22 0.01 2.30 0.00 "R
ja 0.20 0.01 4.69 0.00
"I
ja 4.85 0.47 9.92 0.05 "I
ja 4.25 0.51 9.48 0.02
"
y
ja 65.64 1.69 8.88 0.06 "
y
ja 57.26 1.70 8.74 0.02
"z
ch 3.69 0.10 0.30 0.67 "z
ch 7.48 0.10 0.29 2.83
"¼
ch 4.44 0.68 2.90 1.03 "¼
ch 5.00 0.75 3.22 0.50
"I
ch 0.73 0.17 0.85 0.14 "I
ch 0.82 0.18 1.11 0.07
"z
eu 0.03 0.24 0.35 2.56 "z
eu 0.03 0.24 0.36 2.48
"BLT
us 1.43 0.21 1.13 0.13 "BLT
us 1.58 0.23 1.59 0.05
"g
Y
us 1.01 0.15 0.79 0.09 "g
Y
us 1.11 0.16 1.12 0.04
"g
RPOIL
us 0.22 0.83 1.55 0.00 "g
RPOIL
us 0.41 0.83 1.48 0.00
Other shocks 1.98 0.63 2.08 0.14 Other shocks 2.66 0.68 2.55 0.10
38Appendix I: Variance Decomposition of U.S. Variables
Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective Output In°ation Nominal Real e®ective
gap interest rate exchange rate gap interest rate exchange rate
t=0 t=4
"BLT
us 0.01 0.88 3.46 2.39 "BLT
us 16.54 7.68 15.98 2.82
"g
Y
us 0.01 0.62 2.43 1.68 "g
Y
us 11.62 5.39 11.23 1.98
"¼
us 0.00 91.43 20.27 1.42 "¼
us 1.64 73.35 9.62 1.02
"R
us 0.12 0.01 42.04 0.39 "R
us 15.81 0.05 48.79 0.61
"I
us 0.02 0.15 25.05 0.87 "I
us 5.13 0.63 4.31 0.24
"y
us 99.83 0.27 2.38 0.11 "y
us 46.87 2.06 4.10 0.11
"g
RPOIL
us 0.00 3.77 3.47 0.03 "g
RPOIL
us 0.26 6.46 3.27 0.06
"g
RPOIL
us 0.00 1.29 0.00 0.11 "g
RPOIL
us 0.03 2.42 1.45 0.16
"z
ch 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 "z
ch 0.24 0.01 0.01 1.30
"¼
ch 0.00 0.20 0.21 5.32 "¼
ch 0.87 0.38 0.46 6.42
"I
ch 0.00 0.05 0.06 1.15 "I
ch 0.18 0.11 0.15 1.13
"z
eu 0.00 0.59 0.22 57.41 "z
eu 0.04 0.55 0.17 55.86
"z
ja 0.00 0.35 0.11 28.12 "z
ja 0.08 0.30 0.06 27.37
Other shocks 0.00 0.38 0.29 1.00 Other shocks 0.69 0.61 0.42 0.91
t=8 t=20
"BLT
us 35.28 13.44 27.03 2.46 "BLT
us 34.88 14.27 29.93 1.07
"g
Y
us 24.79 9.44 18.99 1.73 "g
Y
us 24.51 10.02 21.03 0.75
"¼
us 2.61 63.82 6.11 0.64 "¼
us 2.86 62.08 5.53 0.26
"R
us 8.28 0.24 36.15 0.51 "R
us 9.01 0.76 32.44 0.20
"I
us 3.22 0.80 2.83 0.12 "I
us 2.93 0.80 2.60 0.05
"y
us 22.39 1.96 3.32 0.06 "y
us 20.34 1.92 3.00 0.03
"g
RPOIL
us 0.51 5.65 2.17 0.04 "g
RPOIL
us 0.66 5.53 1.97 0.02
"g
RPOIL
us 0.23 2.76 2.06 0.18 "g
RPOIL
us 1.01 2.73 2.03 0.10
"z
ch 0.62 0.02 0.03 3.79 "z
ch 1.37 0.03 0.11 13.71
"¼
ch 1.13 0.39 0.51 5.91 "¼
ch 1.37 0.40 0.51 2.77
"I
ch 0.22 0.13 0.20 1.00 "I
ch 0.27 0.14 0.23 0.50
"z
eu 0.02 0.49 0.13 55.41 "z
eu 0.02 0.47 0.12 52.71
"z
ja 0.07 0.27 0.03 27.34 "z
ja 0.07 0.26 0.03 27.27
Other shocks 0.64 0.59 0.44 0.80 Other shocks 0.71 0.59 0.46 0.57
39Appendix J: Historical Decomposition of Key
Variables
Figure 11: Chinese Output Gap
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40Figure 12: Chinese In°ation

















Lead of Inflation Lag of Inflation Output Gap Change in REER Oil
41Figure 13: Chinese Nominal Interest Rate
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RS_CH(−1) RS_CH neutral Dev from pietar Output Gap Changes in Exchange Rate
42Figure 14: Chinese M2 Growth Rate
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DM_CH(−1) DM_CH neutral Dev from pietar Output Gap Exchange Rate Target
43Appendix K: Evolution of Key Unobservable Variables
over History
Figure 15: Chinese Output Gap, Real Interest Rate Gap, and Real Exchange Rate Gap
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